Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

[Aplin, Justin M]

On 2/14/2011 7:48 AM, grarpamp wrote:
[snip]
> If another example is needed, not that one is; Corporate, edu and
> other LAN's sometimes think they can block 'ooo, encryption bad'
> ports so they can watch their user's plaintext URL's with their
> substandard vendor nanny watch tool of the day. All the while their
> staff laughs at them as they happily tunnel whatever they want over
> that (perhaps even the client or exit parts of Tor). Yes, this kind
> of joke exists :)
[/snip]

Although I've been keeping out of this argument for the most part, and 
even though I'm leaning towards seeing things Mike's way, I just wanted 
to comment that I've actually been in an environment like this several 
times, once at my previous university, and once working for a local 
government organization. As asinine as such reasoning is on the part of 
the network administrator (or the person who signs their checks), I can 
see why the *ability* to run strange exit policies could be a good 
thing, and should be preserved in the software.

However, I see no reason why providing an anonymous contact email would 
be so hard. Certainly if you're going out of your way to avoid [insert 
conspiracy of choice] in order to run a node, you have the skills to use 
one of the hundreds of free email services out there? I don't think 
asking for a tiny bit of responsibility on the part of exit operators is 
too much to ask, and I'm amazed that "allow them to continue to function 
as middle nodes until they explain why their node appears broken or 
malicious" is continually being turned into some kind of human-rights 
violation.

~Justin Aplin

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