Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

[John Case]

On Sat, 12 Feb 2011, Gregory Maxwell wrote:

> So back to the case in question: We must look at the cost of excluding
> an infinitesimal piece of flexibility (the conceivable uses of four
> non-exit flagged exit nodes, is I believe what this policy would
> impact today), vs a tiny piece of social policy (if you want to run an
> exit node to :80, you're going to allow it to exit to :443 as well or
> no one will use it, thus subsidizing port 443 capacity on the back of
> port 80 capacity) and decreased incentive for tor users to run
> personal exit filters (which would result in network partitioning and
> reduced anonymity for everyone if widespread).


I was not aware that "the plan" had evolved into a 1:1 mapping between 
ports you usually use in cleartext and ports you usually use enciphered.

So, if my exit has TCP 19 open ... what will you accept as a suitably 
secure chargen ?  What about 37 ?  I don't know of a standalone time 
protocol that is encrypted ...

Since there is not a clear 1:1 mapping of cleartext and not ports (we 
_can_ agree on that, right ?) then I suppose some system of "weights" will 
have to be applied.  How would this weigh out:

21, 23, 25, 53, 1337, 2105, 5555, 32245

There are four TCP ports that you usually use cleartext, and four that you 
usually use encrypted ... is that exit policy acceptable ?  Or do you 
assign different weights based on how well you know the protocols ?  I've 
sure never heard of "MMTSG-mutualed over MMT (encrypted transmission)" so 
... I'd assue a low weight.

But then what about the malicious operator that takes a few seconds to 
post to or-talk and "explains" their exit policy that didn't weight out 
properly ... then what ?  Is it a panel of three ?  A panel of five ?  Are 
there appeals ?

I'm going to abandon what I thought were slam dunk philosophical arguments 
against this notion and just sit back and wait for the implementation 
proposals.  For the lulz.
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