Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

[Scott Bennett]

     On Mon, 31 Jan 2011 11:30:20 -0500 Andrew Lewman <andrew at torproject.org>
wrote:
>In my opinion, judging a relay based on exit policy is a slippery slope
>we don't want to go down.  We never claim to make using Tor alone safer
>than using the Internet at large.  Whether the creep is at Starbucks
>sniffing the wifi or running a relay is irrelevant to me.  Encouraging
>people to use encrypted communications, the https everywhere firefox
>extension, and learn to be more secure online are some of our goals.
>The Tor Browser Bundle, while still a work in progress, is the best way
>to protect novice users and get them safer than they are without Tor.
>
>I personally run encrypted services on unencrypted ports, like 25, 80,
>143, 110, etc.  It's just a port number and only convention says port
>80 has to be for http only.  
>
>If people start doing deep packet inspection to enforce 80 is really
>http or running filters in some misguided attempt to block "bad
>things" through Tor, then those are reasons to 'badexit' relays.  There
>are some obvious ways we can detect traffic manipulation through Tor
>relays.  Today, we do detect them and badexit those relays.
>
>If we're going to start censoring Tor exits based on impressions, we
>might as well start blocking Tor relays that are rumoured to be run by
>national intelligence agencies, criminal organizations, martians, and
>other people we might not like.  In fact, we might as well go back to
>the original model of "every Tor relay operator has met and gained
>Roger's trust". 
>
>I want a diverse set of Tor relays. If people don't want to trust
>relays based on whatever heuristics they want to use, great, use
>ExcludeNodes in your torrc.  Don't punish everyone based on rumors and
>impressions.
>
     Hear, hear!  Thank you, Andrew, for putting it so clearly in accord
with previously posted policy statements by the tor development team,
both on the tor lists and on the tor project's web site.  I don't know
what triggered Mike's dictatorial moment, but I hope he comes to his
senses quickly (if he hasn't already; I confess I'm hundreds of messages
behind in my email at present).
     Your remark about the "Roger trusts 'em" model does still seem to
apply to the assignment of "Authority" flags.  Given the current directory
protocol(s) and distribution structure, I'm fine with that arrangement for
the time being for "Authority" flagging, but not for "BadExit" flagging for
the reasons you posted, as well as a few posted by others, including myself.


                                  Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
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* Internet:       bennett at cs.niu.edu                              *
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