Anonymity risks of 2 vs 3 hops

[Lexi Pimenidis]

On Fri, Jan 08, 2010 at 08:56:37PM CET, Sam Peterson wrote:

Hej,

> Clearly the experts think it makes things considerably easier here, so
> maybe there's something I'm missing.  I appreciate all tutelage.

Just one trivial example is: given that you only have two hop circuits
and an attacker who owns, e.g., four nodes. If your circuit enters the
Tor network he can kill any circuit using any other node than one of
his three as an exit sooner or later, possibly in a way which makes you
believe that it was "just the typical tor way of killing circuits".
This way an attacker can trick you into building a more than
proportional part of crcuits over his nodes.  The same attack would not
be possible, or as easily, with an unrelated middle node.

Cheers,

	Lexi

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