leaker-optimized versions of Tor

[Eugen Leitl]

On Wed, Dec 08, 2010 at 03:15:24PM +0100, Mitar wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> > It should default to a much larger number of hops,
> 
> Why? Is this really necessary?

Tor as is wasn't designed to resist TLA-level adversaries (which
have no issues instrumenting each Tor node upstream with realtime
network probes, and dedicate enough resouces for traffic analysis).

Relaxing the realtime constraint, adding random delays, more 
hops and also chaff trafic in a Tor derivate would arguably 
make such attacks more difficult. 

Of course such a derivate would not play nice with the
existing Tor network, and should be run as a separate
entity. Due to limited carrying capacity such a network
would be probably more vulnerable to denial of service
attacks (flooding traffic from within).

-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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