https proxy [was polipo]
coderman
coderman at gmail.com
Mon Aug 23 18:40:14 UTC 2010
On Mon, Aug 23, 2010 at 8:58 AM, morphium <morphium at morphium.info> wrote:
>> I can see it could provide some
>> protection against ssl/ssh mitm attacks.
>
> No. Why do you think it could?
- because by default applications trust either a large, promiscuous
set of certificate authorities, or even worse, use the operating
system supplied list of trusted authorities.
- because by default applications do not or cannot utilize mitigating
measures like perspective based certificate retrieval and consensus
from varying endpoints or sources.
- because by default applications may not support robust cipher suites
or handle some aspects of protocol or session negotiation poorly /
incorrectly / insecurely.
- because by default applications don't support a persistent, mobile
store of trusted server certificates built up over time, which a proxy
could provide (Tahoe LAFS / encrypted $cloud storage for your
certificate store available wherever you need it.)
- lots of additional reasons...
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