25 tbreg relays in directory

[Marcus Griep]

On Wed, 2009-07-01 at 17:15 -0600, Jim McClanahan wrote:
> I remain unconvinced that what happened in the case of "tbreg" should be
> determining policy for the Tor project, at least as far as client
> activity is concerned.  To the extent the people who installed really
> didn't know it involved Tor, it seems to me that, if not technically
> malware, it is at least a close cousin (where software creators are not
> being up front with users).  Trying to, in effect, be the guardian of
> such users is (IMHO) a losing proposition.

Perhaps the better action, in the event that there is clear evidence
that a group is using the Tor network to abuse a service provider, such
as eBay, would be to alert them to what is happening, and help to
provide them the tools they need to stem the tide, even if that means
that they temporarily block the Tor network or are able to gain some
insight into how the fraudulent activity is occurring. After all,
providing this means is in part what the Tor DNS Exit List and Bulk Exit
Lists are for.

As well, by being forthright the Tor network could be seen as a
generally good network, but which has bad users too, rather than being
found as a major source of fraud after the fact and determined a bad
network overall.

Possibly out on my own limb, but that's my opinion.

-- 
Marcus Griep
GPG Key ID: 0x070E3F2D
——
https://torproj.xpdm.us
Ακακια את.ψο´, 3°
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