Please help me test my hidden service

[Nils Vogels]

Hi Scott,

On Tue, Aug 4, 2009 at 10:26 AM, Scott Bennett<bennett at cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>     For that matter, it's probably best *not* to run most kinds of hidden
> services on tor relays precisely because tor relays are well known through
> the directory.  Running a hidden service on a client-only tor would be the
> safest way because clients are not listed anywhere as such.  There might be
> a place for running a hidden service on a bridge, but it would have to be
> for something not terribly dangerous to the hidden service operator because
> bridges *are* known to the bridge authorities and thus must be considered to
> be listed somewhere.  Something like a web service that is also accessible
> directly and publicly and that presents no known danger to its operator (e.g.,
> the various tor status pages) can reasonably be run on a tor relay node,
> a bridge, or a client.

Just trying to figure out what you are saying here:

A hidden service has it's own identifier and to my knowledge, there is
no link between the hidden service and the node that is running it,
you seem to suggest otherwise?

If there is a link between the hidden service and the node that is
running it, then I wonder how *hidden* a hidden service actually is
... since at that point it is just "a service running on node x" and
the term hidden service would be kind of deceiving.

Just because the node running it is a relay or a bridge, does that
make it less hidden? If there is no link between the service and the
node, I don't see how.

Greetings,

Nils
-- 
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