Blocking child pornography exits

[BlueStar88]

Am Samstag, den 21.07.2007, 04:49 -0400 schrieb Ron Wireman:
> From: Ron Wireman <ronwireman at gmail.com>
> Date: 21-Jul-2007 04:48
> Subject: Re: Blocking child pornography exits 
> To: Scott Bennett <bennett at cs.niu.edu>

[...]

> It's not about morality; it's about protecting children.  I didn't ask
> anyone to create any sort of anonymizing network, but since the tor
> group did, it's incumbent upon them to make sure it's used properly
> and that includes insuring it isn't used to harm children in the U.S.
> or elsewhere.  Otherwise, all they've done is unleash a paedophilic
> monster in a Chuck E. Cheese restoraunt.

[...]

It seems to be about the top most often used overkill arguments:
establish censoring mechanisms to fight against terrorism and childporn.
It would be the begin of the end of any anonymizer project. Heard that
too often before.
Besides it would be unmanageable to handle such preconfigured exit
policies because of the heavy fluctuation of such sites. Who should do
this work in person? What about responsibility and trust? Furthermore
you have to only block specific domainnames, not IPs. You would
otherwisely block all virtual sites on that IP even with 'normal'
content.

Conclusion

I assume no single child would be protected from the defact abuse, if
the access to such sites is blocked somehow. While the molestion itself
is done off-line, there has to be some much more worthful action another
way: Watch your neighbors childs, listen to them, keep your eyes and
ears open and take action if there is something wrong!

The ignorance of the people is the beast to fight against.



Greets

-- 
BlueStar88 <BlueStar88 at Xenobite.eu>
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