Quick Concerns re: Traffic injection + Tor Control port

[Freemor]

Hi All,

  The Recent talk about an exit nodes ability to inject/modify traffic
got me thinking that this might actually pose a security risk not just
for users but possibly for the tor network in general.

   My thinking went along the lines that it would be fairly trivial for
someone experienced in Java or other scripting languages to inject a
script that would internally scan the receiving computer for an open Tor
control port (read open and non-authenticated) once that was found the
script could easily and completely hose up the security of that node by
messing with the routing/exitnodes/ControlListenAddress/etc. Bad enough
if it is a client tor installation, Tragic is it is an entry/middle/exit
node as well.

   I think the simple solution would be to require authentication if the
Tor control port is open.

   Now just to make a few things clear. 

   I do understand that allowing any scripting when using Tor is
hideously bad, but judging from all the clear text passwords going
through others may not.

   I most certainly am not a Java/Java Script wizard and so could be way
off on the triviality of such a program.

   My intent in posting this was not to criticize but to stimulate
intelligent conversation on what I perceive as a possible risk to the
Tor network.

    

------

Freemor <freemor at yahoo.ca>
Freemor <freemor at rogers.com>

This e-mail has been digitally signed with GnuPG


-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 191 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/attachments/20060819/10369f20/attachment.pgp>