AllowedUnverifiedNodes

[ADB]

This is not *entirely* related, but I'm typing it here before I forget, 
which can happen quite suddenly at times! My question is: I've picked up 
that Tor compression has been considered, at least in passing, before. 
What algorythms were considered? Just gzip or something else? I've used 
Guttman and VanSomebodyOrOther algorythms, at least in the context of 
ethernet frames/TCPIP and it gains about 8-10x more throughput on 
avarage. The problem is that they require all the routers in the path to 
actually support compression, which doesn't often happen.
    I guess the bottom line here is: Can plain old generic SSL be 
compressed, or is that functionality specific to the SSh toolset itself 
and not the SSL protocol proper?

~Andrew

Roger Dingledine wrote:

>On Tue, Aug 30, 2005 at 04:06:27PM -0700, Tor Operator wrote:
>  
>
>>I submitted a bug to the torcp bugtracker about the
>>AllowUnverifiedNodes setting, but wasn't sure what the correct syntax
>>would be for allowing no unverified nodes.
>>
>>Is it just "AllowUnverifiedNodes "on a line by itself for none?  I
>>tried "AllowUnverifiedNodes None" and "AllowUnverifiedNodes Null",
>>but tor doesn't like any of those lines.  It accepts
>>"AllowUnverifiedNodes ", but I don't know if that just reverts to the
>>default of "middle, rendezvous" or does it actually mean none.
>>    
>>
>
>Thanks for spotting this bug.
>
>In the upcoming 0.1.1.6-alpha release, there will be a new controller
>command "RESETCONF AllowUnverifiedNodes" which will return it to its
>default ("middle,rendezvous").
>
>The command "SETCONF AllowUnverifiedNodes" will set it to "".
>
>You will also be able to set it to "" in your torrc by putting the
>line "AllowUnverifiedNodes" by itself in your torrc.
>
>Thanks,
>--Roger
>
>
>
>
>  
>

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