Why TOR Operators SHOULD always sniff their exit traffic...

[Eugen Leitl]

On Thu, Jun 09, 2005 at 12:36:43PM -0700, Parker Thompson wrote:

> projects.  Further, I see this as far preferable to letting operators
> develop their own best practices on an ad-hoc basis.

There's value in social contracts such as a web of trust between operators,
but the best solution is obviously just seeking safety in numbers. If Tor node density
in address space is sufficiently high, both the performance improves (it is not really 
practical for impatient users right now), and traffic analysis/exit node snooping 
becomes prohibitive for any adversary (save of the persons controlling
software upgrades for populars OSses, of course).

-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
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ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
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