(FWD) Tor, Socks bind, and BitTorrent

[Paul Gardner]

Hmm, I've set up a hidden service for the tracker and I'm getting core-dumps
with 0.0.8 when I run. I'm on Windows XP. Anything I can do to help diagnose
the problem? It dumps immediately if the service dir exists. It dumps after
a while if I delete the dir and run.

cheers
Paul

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Paul Gardner" <parg at users.sourceforge.net>
To: <or-talk at freehaven.net>
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2004 7:44 AM
Subject: Re: (FWD) Tor, Socks bind, and BitTorrent


> I have it working at the moment by proxying the tracker traffic (currently
> defaulting to SOCKS V5 due to Java doing the proxying for us) and outbound
> peer-to-peer traffic (via SOCKS 4a lashed up by myself). Of course, if
> eveyone relies on outbound only then things don't work, so this approach
> will only help if a small percentage of peers are taking it.
>
> The idea of a hidden tracker sounds interesting, I'll investigate further.
>
> Are there plans for a Java version of your software? SSL is "built in", as
> are a lot of other security functions, so it may be fairly straight
forward
> to implement.
>
> Do you think you could ever scale to carry BT traffic?
>
> Paul
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Wes Felter" <wesley at felter.org>
> To: <or-talk at freehaven.net>
> Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2004 6:08 AM
> Subject: Re: (FWD) Tor, Socks bind, and BitTorrent
>
>
> > On Sep 29, 2004, at 3:26 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> > >
> > > How do clients interact with the Tracker in BT -- do they connect once
> > > and keep talking periodically, or do they connect every so often, talk
> > > a bit, and disconnect?
> >
> > Since the tracker protocol is just HTTP, it's the latter.
> >
> > > b) Each user runs behind a hidden service.
> >
> > This isn't strictly necessary, since BT peers don't *have* to accept
> > incoming connections at all. A peer that only makes outgoing
> > connections can still participate in the BT swarm, and that model
> > should work with Tor easily.
> >
> > This leaves the problem that the peers who *do* listen for connections
> > are exposed.
> >
> > Wes Felter - wesley at felter.org - http://felter.org/wesley/
> >
>