[tor-reports] SponsorR October 2015 report

[George Kadianakis]

George Kadianakis <desnacked at riseup.net> writes:

> Hello,
>
> here is the October 2015 report for SponsorR:
>
> - The first bunch of hidden service statistics is now enabled by default.  The
>   feature was enabled in tor-0.2.7.3 and the coverage graphs have already
>   climbed slightly: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-frac-reporting.html
>
>   The stats enabled are:
>     * The total number of unique hidden services:
>       Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html
>     * The total volume of hidden service traffic on the network:
>       Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html
>
> - As part of our larger statistical efforts, we did another security and privacy
>   evaluation of the above stats to ensure that the obfuscatory noise we are
>   adding is indeed completely covering the tracks of individual users.
>
>   We performed the evaluation by extracting all the hidden service statistics
>   values that were reported by relays over the month of September. Then we
>   manually inspected them to see that the noise we are adding is significantly
>   affecting the reports of relays. A more detailed analysis can be found here:
>      https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:33
>
>   We invite people to use or even expand our dataset to evaluate the privacy of
>   our statistics.
>
> - We also improved on the HSDir health tool that tracks the health of the HSDir
>   subsystem and the correctness of descriptor uploading by hidden services:
>      https://gitlab.com/hs-health/hs-health/blob/master/design.md
>
>   You can now see its results updated in real time:
>      http://ygzf7uqcusp4ayjs.onion/tor-health/tor-health/index.html
>
> - As part of our efforts to engage the research community, we met with UCL
>   researchers and students who have interest in anonymity-related topics like
>   hidden services, private statistics, and mixnets. We discussed ideas regarding
>   guard node security, detecting active end-to-end correlation attacks and
>   hidden service scaling techniques.
>
> - To further lubricate the research community, we published a document
>   describing the current status of open hidden service proposals. We also
>   provided a brief summary for each proposal so that researchers and developers
>   can get up to date faster:
>      https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/torz-dev/2015-October/009762.html2
>

Oops. The link here should have been:
     https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009762.html

Sorry about that!