[tor-relays] Tor Relay Operator Community Health - Final report (June 2024)

[boldsuck]

On Thursday, 17 October 2024 16:17 gus wrote:

> - Main report:
> https://www.sr2.uk/reports/2024-TorRelayOperatorCommunityHealth.pdf -
> Mirror:
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/-/project/60/uploads/846d7d1816aee92fd2ee283b6
> a354c7d/2024-TorRelayOperatorCommunityHealth.pdf

Wow, I'm only up to 4.4.

- So I'm the only DAU in this survey ;-)

- Exit operators (some of whom have been to jail). are the ones most expected 
to disclose their data.

- A trusted group, exceeding a certain percentage of the total consensus 
weight most people find worse than a single operator running multiple relays 
using different personas and alias?
Yes, more distribution is nice. But I'd rather have NTH and quetzo in my node 
list than the next KAX17.

Whether now after the reports about 'Operation Liberty' where it was about 
detecting onion services¹ and guard nodes, the answers would be the same?

¹All node types are involved in hidden services (guard, middle, exit).

Every assistant admin at Hetzner and OVH can monitor a significant part of the 
Tor network. In addition, Netflow data is transmitted to anyone who can pay for 
it. But well-known relay groups are the bad guys :-) 

-- 
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!

Debian GNU/Linux

It's free software and it gives you freedom!
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