[tor-relays] Request for Feedback on Relay Node Update Management
denny.obreham at a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net
denny.obreham at a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net
Tue Mar 26 12:49:43 UTC 2024
Relays do restart for different reasons. For example, two of my relays
(the upgrade process is automated on both) were restarted on March
23rd, practically at the same time.
Different OS versions on different machines from different ISP for both
relays.
One was restarted because some libraries needed to be upgraded on the
system:
```
The following packages will be upgraded:
libbsd0 libc-bin libc6 libxslt1.1 locales
5 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 0 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
[...]
Restarting services...
[...] tor at default.service [...]
```
The server even needed to be rebooted afterward.
The other one had a very different reason, as you can see from the
syslog:
```
Mar 23 03:07:43 leslie kernel: [849147.801728] Out of memory: Killed
process 930 (tor) total-vm:850180kB, anon-rss:620800kB, file-rss:0kB,
shmem-rss:0kB, UID:111 pgtables:1652kB oom_score_adj:0
Mar 23 03:07:43 leslie systemd[1]: tor at Leslie.service: A process of
this unit has been killed by the OOM killer.
Mar 23 03:07:44 leslie systemd[1]: tor at Leslie.service: Main process
exited, code=killed, status=9/KILL
Mar 23 03:07:44 leslie systemd[1]: tor at Leslie.service: Failed with
result 'oom-kill'.
Mar 23 03:07:44 leslie systemd[1]: tor at Leslie.service: Consumed 2d 5h
54min 39.122s CPU time.
Mar 23 03:07:44 leslie systemd[1]: tor at Leslie.service: Scheduled
restart job, restart counter is at 1.
Mar 23 03:07:44 leslie systemd[1]: Stopped Anonymizing overlay network
for TCP (instance Leslie).
Mar 23 03:07:44 leslie systemd[1]: tor at Leslie.service: Consumed 2d 5h
54min 39.122s CPU time.
Mar 23 03:07:44 leslie systemd[1]: Starting Anonymizing overlay network
for TCP (instance Leslie)...
```
That was the last time both relays were restarted (~ 3 days ago)
Denny
On 03/26/2024 04:54 AM Alessandro Greco via tor-relays wrote ..
Dear Tor-Relays Mailing List Members, I hope this email finds you
well. I'm reaching out to share some observations and pose some
questions regarding the management of relay node updates,
particularly concerning their impact on stability and security of
the service provided. Recently, I've noticed an interesting pattern
with my relay node (ID: 47B72187844C00AA5D524415E52E3BE81E63056B
[1]). I've followed TorProject's recommendations [2] and configured
automatic updates, which has led to frequent restarts of the node to
keep the Tor software up-to-date. While this practice ensures high
security by keeping the software updated, it seems to compromise the
stability of the node itself. The Uptime value of my node has
remained at a maximum of a few hours. This situation has prompted me
to reflect on what might be the best strategy to adopt. On one hand,
frequent updates ensure optimal security, while on the other hand,
continuous restarts may affect the user experience for those relying
on the node's stability for their Tor activities. As such, I'd like
to pose some questions to the community to gather feedback and
assess best practices: 1. In your opinion, is it preferable to
maintain automatic updates to ensure maximum security, even if
frequent restarts may compromise the node's stability? 2. Or would
it be more sensible to adjust the update frequency, perhaps
performing them once or twice a week, to ensure greater stability of
the node without excessively compromising security? 3. Have you had
similar experiences with your relay nodes? How have you addressed
this challenge and what were the outcomes? Thank you in advance for
your time and cooperation. Best regards, Aleff. [1]
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/47B72187844C00AA5D524
415E52E3BE81E63056B [2]
https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/guard/debian-ubuntu/upd
ates/ --- Browse my WebSite: aleff-gitlab.gitlab.io Use my PGP
Public Key: pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x7CFCE404A2168C85
Join to support: - Free Software Foundation!
(my.fsf.org/join?referrer=6202114) - Electronic Frontier Foundation!
(eff.org) - Tor-Project (torproject.org) - Signal (signal.org)
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