[tor-relays] Tor non-exit list

[tor at nullvoid.me]

boldsuck:
> On Donnerstag, 20. Juni 2024 02:00:18 CEST tor at nullvoid.me wrote:
> However, this non-exit list should not be activated automatically or with one-
> click. There is no reason to block non-exit relays.
> 

I agree, maybe this open letter is better aimed at the security vendors 
that include DAN's (non-exit) Tor relays list on a blocklist by default, 
or without warning about potential impact to other legitimate services 
(universities, libraries, shared hosting providers, hobbyist email, etc)

> Ransomware links are usually opened from emails and Tor is not running on
> company computers. Users cannot install anything either. How are they supposed
> to reach the hidden services?

Once the malware runs it will phone home over Tor to the .onion, from a 
network perspective this will look like a TCP connection to an entry 
node. I can see many reasons to maintain a list on known entry nodes to 
prevent unauthorized applications or users from connection out of a 
network. Those lists should not be enabled by default to block.

> We should perhaps consider at the relay meeting on Saturday whether several
> relay operators or the Tor Project could write to dan.me.uk. He shouldn't make
> it so easy to activate the non-exit list. For example, UniFi devices are often
> installed by inexperienced admins. They simply click on all the block lists
> without knowing what they are.

Maybe reaching out to UniFi would be better than to the DAN project.
I agree discussion with the rest of the relay community and a strong 
consensus on how to approach the over-blocking problem would be nice.

Regards,
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