[tor-relays] Open call for proposals for improving the health of the Tor relay operator community and the Tor network

[gus]

On Fri, Mar 03, 2023 at 11:26:07PM +0100, nusenu wrote:
> I've got some practical experience with how things are (not) handled
> by the Tor Project in this space which discourages involvement.
> The past has also shown that proposals in this area are not
> handled as tor proposals in the sense of [1].

I believe some proposals about relay operators were not handled as
people had different opinions about the Tor Community governance and its
process. But, as I said in my previous email, after 2 years of Network Health
team work, we have seen how much important is to build a trusted and
healthy Tor Community.

> > We're not in the process of approving any of them.
> 
> a few questions:
> 
> - Can you describe the process these proposals will undergo after they got collected?
> - Who "approves" / rejects them?
> - Will it be a public and transparent process?
> - Who will be involved in the process?
> - How are relay operators included and to what extend?
> 
> - Will "approved" proposals be enforced?
> - How will they get enforced? New tor release or directory authority vote?
> - Will directory authorities be formally required to enforce "approved" proposals?

Great questions.

- Yes, it will be a public and transparent process; 
- Yes, it's a community-driven process;

As part of Tor's culture, we try to discuss proposals exhaustively until
we reach a consensus. But, that said, there is a lack of formal process.
Our goal is to build this governance process. 

As part of the Tor Community, relay operators must be included, and
that's why we're bootstrapping this process with this open call and
inviting everyone to discuss this topic at the tor relay operators
meetups. Are you joining us today?

> > how to make it more difficult for attackers to run relays while keeping
> > it easy for good contributors to join our network.
> 
> Will there be a longer problem statement and a
> description of your threat model?
> 
> > adopted by a meaningful fraction of the Tor community (e.g.
> > providing valid contact information).
> 
> Can you elaborate on how you define "valid" in this context?

From the Expectations for relay operators:

"Be sure to set your ContactInfo to a working email address in case we
need to reach you."

https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/team/-/wikis/Expectations-for-Relay-Operators

cheers,
Gus

[1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/relays/-/issues/18

> 
> kind regards,
> nusenu
> 
> 
> [1]
> https://blog.torproject.org/tor-design-proposals-how-we-make-changes-our-protocol/
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/001-process.txt
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> https://nusenu.github.io
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays


-- 
The Tor Project
Community Team Lead
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