[tor-relays] Comcast blocks ALL traffic with tor relays
s7r
s7r at sky-ip.org
Mon Jun 12 14:50:23 UTC 2023
xmrk2 via tor-relays wrote:
> Any ideas on how to combat this? I was thinking about including some
> false positives in tor relay list. Imagine including some Google
> servers' IP addresses - Comcast customers suddenly cannot connect to
> Google, unless Comcast stops this blocking... or simply whitelists
> Google. But those false positives sound ugly and a bit malicious, not
> sure it is a good idea.
>
This sucks big time, if true. I am trying to ping Comcast from a middle
relay IP address and it seams, to work, I guess you mean AS33651 -
Comcast Cable LLC. Anyway, it could be, at latest consensus there is no
single relay (middle or exit) hosted in AS33651.
I am not sure about the false positive solution, I see only downsides,
including but not limited to:
- it's not ethical for Tor Project to do this, e.g. stating another
company's infrastructure (say Google IP address space) is part of a
network when in fact its not. I get it that the goal is privacy oriented
and in good faith (freedom faith) but it seams rather inappropriate;
- there is no evidence that a blocker might use a list of relays
provided by Tor Project's metrics portal (I am confident nobody does it
because it's less effective) - they can just run a Tor client and get a
copy of a consensus and extract from there IP:PORT IPv6:PORT and do from
there whatever they please;
- if you include such false positives in the consensus you have to
simulate dummy Tor relays on those "hot" IP addresses, like providing an
onion key, RSA identity and ed25519 identity, thus looking like a relay,
state some bandwidth for it, etc - in this case how will a Tor client
know which relay is dummy and which not, in order not to try to
establish circuits that fail, ultimately producing a terrible user
experience for all users. Same applies for other relays, not just
clients, that need to produce connections with the dummy relays. If we
somehow mark them as "dummy", it will be pretty stupid and obvious and
waste of effort as the blocker can simply understand the "dummy" marker
and it's done, I guess it's pretty obvious.
> I already wrote about this publicly, and also wrote a mail to EFF. Hope
> I am not spamming, I feel this is quite important issue and am a bit
> frustrated by the lack of attention it gets.
>
Not at all, this is very interesting and not spamming at all. I think it
is unacceptable for this to happen, and I think all Comcast customers
should quit if this is true - large internet corporations are trying to
move on from "IP address identifications" as in only a beginner that
discovered the internet one week ago still thinks of the IP address as
"identification of a certain individual / entity", everybody is moving
to advanced layers of authentication on per device basis, cryptographic
public key, etc. Comcast if they do such a thing they set themselves 25
years behind the industry they operate in. And this can create many
unwanted effects, someone should try to do something about this but I am
not sure what we Tor volunteers *can* do to help with this, especially
the ones that are not Comcast customers. EFF is the best start IMO.
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