[tor-relays] proof:dns-rsa Re: New OrNetStats Section: Largest Bridge Operators

[Jonas Friedli]

the bridge may just should not run on the IP the second level domain A / 
AAAA resolves to.

  lists at for-privacy.net:
> On Sunday, May 29, 2022 6:25:02 PM CEST nusenu wrote:
> 
>> AROI support for bridges
>>
>> You can also protect your bridge ContactInfo against spoofing now.
>> The same fields as for relays apply. If you have setup your AROI [1] on your
>> relays already you can simply copy the ContactInfo to your bridges and
>> publish the list of hashed bridge fingerprints under this URL:
>>
>> https://-your-hostname-/.well-known/tor-relay/hashed-bridge-rsa-fingerprint.
>> txt
> 
> Oh nice, thanks.
> I just saw that nusenu also thought of us 'proof:dns-rsa' users. ;-)
> 
> https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/#dns-rsa
> 
> For bridges:
> 
> hashed-fingerprint.example.com value: “we-run-this-tor-bridge”
> 
> 
> 
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