[tor-relays] Recent rejection of relays

[Georg Koppen]

Georg Koppen:
> Jonas via tor-relays:
>> Where is this criteria documented?
> 
> I am not sure what criteria you mean but we have our bad-relay 
> criteria[1] documented at our wiki and keep fingerprints we reject due 
> to attacks we noticed there as well[2].
> 
>> It seems the tor project, or its designated volunteers, are increasing 
>> controlling and managing the network. In the Swiss Federation and EU 
>> this turns the tor project into an "online service provider" or 
>> "online platform" and subjects one to all sorts of regulations and 
>> compliance regimes.
>>
>> We already get enough requests from the police regarding relays hosted 
>> in our datacenters. Shall we point them at tor as the network operator?
> 
> The Tor Project is not running the network.

There is an additional point that is important here that I forgot (sorry 
for that and thanks to a little bird reminding me): yes, we working on 
hunting malicious relays tracked some of those relays for a while which 
I mentioned in my previous mail and we reached out to some of their 
operators. However, the relays did not got rejected by us at the end of 
the day, but rather by a majority of directory authorities.

Those authorities are a central part of our project, too, but I think 
it's important to point out that the "we" in my original mail was 
supposed to point to different groups within the Tor Project which might 
not have been clear enough.

Georg

> It's comprised of relays run 
> mostly by volunteers. I am actually not really sure either what you are 
> proposing to be honest. Shall we just keep the relays attacking our 
> users in the network instead?
> 
> Georg
> 
> [snip]
> 
> [1] 
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Criteria-for-rejecting-bad-relays 
> 
> [2] 
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks 
> 
> 
>>
>> ---------- Original Message ----------
>> On Wed, November 10, 2021 at 8:59 AM,  Georg Koppen<gk at torproject.org> 
>> wrote:
>> Hello everyone!
>>
>> Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
>> our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
>> roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only
>> a small fraction of them had the guard flag, so the vast majority were
>> middle-only relays. We don't have any evidence that these relays were
>> doing any attack, but there are attacks possible which relays could
>> perform from the middle position. Therefore, we decided we'd remove
>> those relays for our users' safety sake.
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>>
> 
> 
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