[tor-relays] Should new exit relays be probed for public DNS resolvers

[Alec Muffett]

On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 at 14:37, Iain Learmonth <irl at torproject.org> wrote:

> On 05/03/2020 14:20,Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> > It’s not a threat model issue.
>
> Who gets to see Tor users DNS requests is exactly a threat model issue.
>

Concur.  That is exactly the reason that I am asking clarification of
Nathaniel's perspective, here.

I'm currently doing some research on the area, and am particularly
interested in which/all of Nathaniel is concerned by:

1/ blocking of Tor-users' DNS requests
2/ tampering with Tor-user's DNS requests
3/ surveillance of Tor-users' DNS requests
4/ *corporate* surveillance of Tor-users' DNS requests
5/ other...

Because if Nathaniel is primarily interested in 3 and 4 from that list,
then this is a particularly interesting video to watch (cued up to 0:33 for
convenience)

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrGZczZ8tyU&t=0m33s

...and which, with a little reflection regarding the "anonymity loves
company" philosophy of Tor, suggests that the solution might in part be
MORE AND PRIVATE use of "big" resolvers... because the little ones are just
as much, perhaps more of a risk.

    -a

-- 
http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm
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