[tor-relays] Should new exit relays be probed for public DNS resolvers

[Alec Muffett]

On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 at 14:32, Nathaniel Suchy <nathanielsuchy at protonmail.com>
wrote:

> It’s not a threat model issue. It’s more of a let’s make Tor less
> dependent on a few public resolvers.
>

So, you perceive a threat (or: some trait that needs to be mitigated) from
large-scale use of a small population of (otherwise highly available)
public resolvers.

What does that threat (or: similar) look like?

    -a

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