[tor-relays] Blog: How Malicious Tor Relays are Exploiting Users in 2020 (Part I)

[nusenu]

>>> https://medium.com/@nusenu/how-malicious-tor-relays-are-exploiting-users-in-2020-part-i-1097575c0cac
>>>
>>>  There are multiple indicators that suggest that the attacker still
>>> runs >10% of the Tor network exit capacity (as of 2020–08–08)
>>>
>>> And on this one: I trust nusenu who told me we still have massiv
>>> malicious relays.
>>
>> as some of you have probably seen already
>> now a fraction of them got confirmed to run the same attack tools:
>> https://twitter.com/notdan/status/1295813432843829251
>>
>> Unfortunately this is not the end of it.
> 
> Yeah, it never ends. It's an ongoing issue.

Until rules are in place that reduce the risk from this reoccurring on this scale and at this rate.

>> What I'm still wondering about is: What made Tor directory authorities change their policies and stop removing undeclared relay groups?
> 
> I don't think this is the right list to ask directory authorities about
> that. 

It was meant to share my thoughts on this (more than actually expecting an answer even though there are actual dir auths on this list).

-- 
https://mastodon.social/@nusenu



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