[tor-relays] Is the public information for relays trustable?

[Gunnar Wolf]

Hi,

I just asked a superset of this question to the IRC channel - But I
want to be able to better refer to the subset that wasn't answered
there ;-)

I am working together with some other people to increase the number of
relays in Mexico. We have finally started to increase the number -
from our usual two active relays to four, still WAY too low, but it's
a beginning:

    https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:mx

But there are some issues / questions bugging me:

When we set out to pursue this, we faced the reality that most Mexican
ISPs block Tor relays in some way or another: The main ISP in the
country (Telmex / Infinitum / Uninet, depending on the business branch
in question) blocks all communication to seven of the dirauths,
thereby making it impossible to operate a relay (although bridges do
work); many other ISPs employ a set of nested NAT systems, making it
impossible for external computers to reach a server inside it...

However, we have at least one relay claiming to be from Uninet
(5F6E720D7F0A95D6276B6F6DF8C210735A331B9D - Not currently online, but
made it to the consensus at least at several points over the past
months).

We also have some in an ISP that gives addresses behind multiple
layers of NAT and are unworkable
(FF3FF664B0811B2E3C237BECA4382966AD9E393C,
6E483A91105C647A65ED04E1CB637AAD84F5943F)

So... Is this information right? Can this be in some way spoofed? How
should I interpret this?

Thanks,
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