[tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

[nusenu]

Roger Dingledine:
>  And speaking of
> community-building, are there volunteers lined up who would contact
> bridge operators if given the chance, or is this more of a theoretical
> "maybe it would happen"?

I'll eventually add a check for "is exit operator also a bridge operator?" and 
might contact operators in such cases (I'm not saying this is 'communicty-building').


> Thought 4: In retrospect, it would be good to have some initial analysis
> of the (currently secret) data set. For example, how many bridges set
> contactinfo, and how many don't? How many of each of those are 'fast'
> (popular) bridges? What fraction of the contactinfos are actually a
> usable email address? How many bridge families are there now, i.e.
> bridges that use the same contact email address? Maybe most bridges
> don't set it currently, so this whole question doesn't matter much, or
> maybe many of them set it but obfuscate it, which will make your
> notification plan harder than you predicted.

I really like T4.

thanks for your thoughts!

-- 
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twitter: @nusenu_

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