[tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 89, Issue 49

Tue Jun 26 14:52:54 UTC 2018

first, Thank you all for you answers and help.
let me make it a bit harder. now, im running a relay which is Guard and
Exit relays.
i have defined in my relay(the server that's running the relay in /torrc
file) to be "AllowSingleHopExits 1"
and set in my computer that running the TOR(in /torrc file) with the 1(one)
hop to:
"ExcludeSingleHopRelays  0"    and
"AllowSingleHopCircuits  1"
so now every thing needs to be ok right?
but, still its not working

On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:34 PM, <tor-relays-request at lists.torproject.org>
wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Is Tor-network protected from using one hop? (dave levi)
>    2. Re: Is Tor-network protected from using one hop? (Logforme)
>    3. Re: Is Tor-network protected from using one hop? (Matt Traudt)
>    4. Re: Is Tor-network protected from using one hop? (Nagaev Boris)
>    5. Re: Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?
>       (Roger Dingledine)
>    6. Re: Is Tor-network protected from using one hop? (Matt Traudt)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 17:16:46 +0300
> From: dave levi <levi72827 at gmail.com>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: [tor-relays] Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?
> Message-ID:
>         <CAJUku5hQa5JCk1UCn_CynyVG=kxhXkQpC0-ApW=k7vJxPrTM5g@
> mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
>  I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from the
> source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it work's
> fine(slowly,  but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's its still
> works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the Tor-browser
> but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site or onion site
> too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected from users who
> are using 1 hop?
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 14:25:42 +0000
> From: Logforme <m7527 at abc.se>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?
> Message-ID: <emc7fcd1ee-3ce9-4161-9a90-c2fd28b951b5 at mats-win7>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>
> On 2018-06-26 16:16:46, "dave levi" <levi72827 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from
> >the source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it
> >work's fine(slowly,  but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's
> >its still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the
> >Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site
> >or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected
> >from users who are using 1 hop?
>
> I guess it's part of the DoS protection recently implemented. My guard
> relay DoS statistics in the heartbeat log entry:
>
> [notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many
> cells. 232704 circuits rejected, 15 marked addresses. 2939 connections
> closed. 1534 single hop clients refused.
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:27:29 -0400
> From: Matt Traudt <pastly at torproject.org>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?
> Message-ID: <35ec8dd3-43bc-1c71-4cb0-00029ba56e64 at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
> On 6/26/18 10:16, dave levi wrote:
> > I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from the
> > source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it
> > work's fine(slowly,  but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's its
> > still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the
> > Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site
> > or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected
> > from users who are using 1 hop?
> >
>
> Yes.
>
> Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves
> to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion
> service circuits too.
>
> If you want a single-hop proxy, then you don't want Tor.
>
> Matt
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 17:29:29 +0300
> From: Nagaev Boris <bnagaev at gmail.com>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?
> Message-ID:
>         <CAFC_Vt7906rh2R33hb-tXr3TME5Op2gVbOGvuT79kMRyivTNh
> Q at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
>
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Matt Traudt <pastly at torproject.org>
> wrote:
> > On 6/26/18 10:16, dave levi wrote:
> >> I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from the
> >> source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it
> >> work's fine(slowly,  but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's its
> >> still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the
> >> Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site
> >> or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected
> >> from users who are using 1 hop?
> >>
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves
> > to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion
> > service circuits too.
> >
> > If you want a single-hop proxy, then you don't want Tor.
> >
> > Matt
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
> How does a relay know if there is another relay in the circuit? What
> if the attacker runs a "relay" locally?
>
> --
> Best regards,
> Boris Nagaev
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:31:53 -0400
> From: Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?
> Message-ID: <20180626143153.GC19069 at moria.seul.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 10:27:29AM -0400, Matt Traudt wrote:
> > Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves
> > to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion
> > service circuits too.
>
> Right. Relays protect themselves from being used as one-hop proxies,
> because it could make life harder for the operators:
>
> "Currently there is no reason to suspect that investigating a single
> relay will yield user-destination pairs, but if many people are using
> only a single hop, we make it more likely that attackers will seize or
> break into relays in hopes of tracing users."
>
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#ChoosePathLength
>
> --Roger
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:34:50 -0400
> From: Matt Traudt <pastly at torproject.org>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?
> Message-ID: <a72e788e-1083-5f4c-8aec-9ba6cfd96959 at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
> On 6/26/18 10:29, Nagaev Boris wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Matt Traudt <pastly at torproject.org>
> wrote:
> >> On 6/26/18 10:16, dave levi wrote:
> >>> I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from
> the
> >>> source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it
> >>> work's fine(slowly,  but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's
> its
> >>> still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the
> >>> Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site
> >>> or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected
> >>> from users who are using 1 hop?
> >>>
> >>
> >> Yes.
> >>
> >> Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves
> >> to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion
> >> service circuits too.
> >>
> >> If you want a single-hop proxy, then you don't want Tor.
> >>
> >> Matt
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> tor-relays mailing list
> >> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> >
> > How does a relay know if there is another relay in the circuit? What
> > if the attacker runs a "relay" locally?
> >
>
> The way a client connects to a relay and the way a relay connects to
> another relay is different.
>
> Technically the attacker/user could run a relay/bridge locally and
> connect to that before the remote relay, creating a 2-hop circuit that
> **might** have performance similar to a 1-hop circuit.
>
> Matt
>
>
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> ------------------------------
>
> End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 89, Issue 49
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