[tor-relays] Is Tor-network protected from using one hop?

[Matt Traudt]

On 6/26/18 10:29, Nagaev Boris wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Matt Traudt <pastly at torproject.org> wrote:
>> On 6/26/18 10:16, dave levi wrote:
>>> I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from the
>>> source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it
>>> work's fine(slowly,  but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's its
>>> still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the
>>> Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site
>>> or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected
>>> from users who are using 1 hop?
>>>
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>> Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves
>> to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion
>> service circuits too.
>>
>> If you want a single-hop proxy, then you don't want Tor.
>>
>> Matt
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> 
> How does a relay know if there is another relay in the circuit? What
> if the attacker runs a "relay" locally?
> 

The way a client connects to a relay and the way a relay connects to
another relay is different.

Technically the attacker/user could run a relay/bridge locally and
connect to that before the remote relay, creating a 2-hop circuit that
**might** have performance similar to a 1-hop circuit.

Matt