[tor-relays] FreeBSD 11.1 ZFS Tor Image

[Conrad Rockenhaus]

On Monday, February 26, 2018 11:24:37 AM CST Vinícius Zavam wrote:
> 2018-02-25 21:23 GMT+00:00 Conrad Rockenhaus <conrad at rockenhaus.com>:
> > On Sunday, February 25, 2018 3:05:00 PM CST George wrote:
> > > Conrad Rockenhaus:
> > > > Hello All,
> > > > 
> > > > If anyone is interested, I have a RAW image of a FreeBSD 11.1 ZFS
> 
> image
> 
> > > > that is fully configured and ready to run Tor. Right now it's an
> 
> eight GB
> 
> > > > image, but I'm reducing the size by removing all of the extra stuff
> 
> on it
> 
> > > > from the upgrade from FreeBSD 11 to 11.1.
> > > 
> > > I think it's great to ease the implementation of Tor relays,
> > > particularly on BSDs.
> > 
> > My main thought process behind trying to ease the implementation of BSD
> 
> relays
> 
> > is the fact that we should diversify what we have online within the
> 
> network.
> 
> > Most of our nodes are Linux. What if we have another vulnerability that
> 
> comes
> 
> > out that hits Linux specifically again?
> > 
> > > However, I'd be wary of an image that I didn't build myself, personally.
> > 
> > That's your opinion. The AWS relay project was very successful. Numerous
> > people ran an image that they didn't build. Numerous people also run
> 
> Docker
> 
> > containers that they didn't build. Numerous people run Vagrant boxes they
> > didn't build. You have the right to be weary, but there's numerous people
> 
> out
> 
> > there who run other people's images everyday.
> > 
> > > > If you're interested in the image let me know. This image has been
> 
> fully
> 
> > > > tested on OVH's Openstack infrastructure, so if you're interested in
> > > > running it on their infrastructure, let me know and I can walk you
> > > > through it, or you're more than welcome to host is within my cloud at
> > > > cost (it's a low monthly rate and unlimited bandwidth).
> > > 
> > > Another issue is that OVH is over relied upon for public nodes. It's the
> > > leading ASN with almost 15%.
> > 
> > They're one of the few providers out there that allow exits. That's why
> 
> 15% of
> 
> > our exits are on OVH.
> > 
> > > https://torbsd.org/oostats/relays-bw-by-asn.txt
> > > 
> > > OTOH, I do think we (in particular BSD people) need to facilitate the
> > > implementation of BSD relays, including for VPS services for those
> > > looking to test the waters.
> > 
> > I completely agree.
> 
> I wonder if people hosting Tor relays in any sort of VPS are doing
> filesystem encryption.

I can tell you on OVH, a basic level VPS (one for $5.00/mo) is not encrypted. 
If a customer is willing to spend $7.00/mo more for an additional partition, 
they will be able to have storage to encrypt the the Tor relay information at 
rest.

On the Cloud side, you encrypt the primary volume, so all storage is encrypted 
at rest. 

I can't speak of any of the other providers that provide BSD VPSes or BSD 
Cloud Instances.

> 
> > > The TDP wiki has a list of other BSD-offering VPSs, plus a script for
> > > Vultur to build on OpenBSD. I tend to think using other people's scripts
> > > that can be reviewed and hacked is a better gateway for new relay
> > > operators than images.
> 
> you can combine the FreeBSD jails feature with your idea.
> plus, do not share many Tor instances on the same machine/server/jail.

What my plan is to utilize the official FreeBSD Virtual Machine Images from 
their site and build on top of them with my Ansible Scripts. I should 
hopefully have a beta released next week that we can start hacking on.

> 
> > It would actually be very easy to find tampering within a BSD operating
> 
> system.
> 
> > Again, you're welcome to your opinion, but this is no the first time an
> 
> image
> 
> > has been offered to assist people within in the network, and again, with
> 
> your
> 
> > view, let's get rid of the tor docker containers, the AWS AMIs, etc.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Conrad
> > 
> > > http://wiki.torbsd.org/doku.php?id=en:bsd-vps
> > > 
> > > g
> 
> --
> Vinícius Zavam
> keybase.io/egypcio/key.asc

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