[tor-relays] Experimental DoS mitigation is in tor master

[grarpamp]

> Applications that use a lot of resources will have to rate-limit themselves.
> Otherwise, relays will rate-limit them.

It's possible if relays figure that stuff by #2 might not be
an attack per se, but could be user activities... that relays
might push back on that one by...
- Seeking significantly higher default values committed
- Seeking default action committed as off
- Setting similar on their own relays if commits don't
work. And by not being default off, it should be prominently
documented if #2 affects users activities [1].

Indexers will distribute around it, yielding zero sum gain
for the network and nodes.
Multiparty onion p2p protocols could suffer though if #2 is
expected to affect such things.

Was it ever discovered / confirmed what tool / usage was actually
behind this recent ongoing 'DoS' phase? Whether then manifesting
itself at the IP or tor protocol level.

Sorry if I missed this in all these threads.

[1] There could even be a clear section with simple named
list of all options for further operator reading that could affect
users activities / protocols.