[tor-relays] Running relays in universities? Exit nodes, perhaps? Please share your experience!
Vasilis
andz at torproject.org
Thu Apr 26 12:14:13 UTC 2018
Hi,
Gunnar Wolf:
> 1. This assignation is not factible because the Tor network is not
> compatible with the Acceptable Usage Policies of RedUNAM, being
> this infrastructure oriented to the service of institutional
> goals.
>
> 2. While the Tor network can have reseearch purposes, due to its
> nature and the hiding of IPv4 addresses and anonymous
> connectivity, it is susceptible to be used by third parties from
> outside the University with purposes conflicting with those
> specified in item 1, without any possibility of control or
> regulation from the University's part or from your project.
In most universities there is a person/entity that can override many if not all
possible "restrictions" in order for a project to continue/start successfully.
I suggest you to find these persons that can override these "controls" and
convince how difficult (or impossible?) is to continue/start your research
project without hosting Tor relays.
Persistence usually helps, paying a weekly visit to the people responsible and
asking them for the next steps or how you can help to move this forward.
> 3. Even more so: The Tor network, due to its definition and
> structure, can potentially incorporate third people with
> malicious or even delictive intentions, which would affect not
> only the computers or networks in your Institute or all of the
> University, but also networks outside the institution's control
Another idea will be to do a general Tor presentation at the UNAM university.
The date should be based on the the availability or favored date/time of the
responsible(s) for the network policies (RedUNAM) and the persons that have the
special override powers
Cheers,
~Vasilis
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