[tor-relays] Heartfelt gratitude from censored region

Wed Apr 4 12:06:47 UTC 2018

I'll be your Middle any time. (Since you probably can't reach me for your
Guard.) Good luck, friend.

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018, 00:05 <jackoreamnos at tutanota.com> wrote:

> For those who may skip emails by the subject line, I resend my own email.
>
> There is a sinking feel in general over here, where a bunch of us learn
> more about Tor.  We learnt we cannot run our own relays because here
> censorship is very strong; at the same time, we realize we have many relay
> operators in other countries to thank, for giving us a window into the
> world.
>
> Thank you.  And I write this email over Tor.
>
> - Jack
>
>
> Date: 4. Apr 2018 03:55
> From: jackoreamnos at tutanota.com
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Cc: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 87, Issue 4
>
> We had some more discussions over here, and someone pointed out a key fact
> which we novices did not get at first - the Tor network does not REALLY
> trust the relay operators until the directory authorities DAs (whose IPs
> are hardcoded into the source code) can check them out and then vote about
> what they have learnt about these relays.  If relays pass that test, they
> get onto a live document called the "Consensus" (between the DAs).  So new
> clients to the network trust these DAs and they trust the consensus reached
> by the DAs.  That is how new clients learn the network topology and find
> relays to connect to.
>
> So we were wrong on a few points:
> (1) we thought we can contribute to the relay networks without being
> detected, but basically no - you cannot contribute to the relay network
> unless you are in the consensus, and if you are in the consensus, your IP
> address is world readable.
> (2) a private bridge is providing relay WITHOUT publishing descriptors to
> the consensus, so it is a hybrid creature: (a) it appears as a client to
> the Tor network proper, being hidden from the consensus, and therefore
> cannot help relay traffic; (b) it appears as a relay server to connecting
> clients but unlike relays already on the consensus certain clients trust it
> because they know about the private bridge from channels they trust outside
> the Tor consensus; and these clients gain a extra measure of security from
> whatever obfuscation the bridge can offer.
>
> So by design, Tor does not trust and cannot completely trust a relay that
> just pops up one day.  There is no way for Tor DAs to work with a relay
> node that hides itself behind a VPN.
>
> So in the area where we live, if we run a relay, we will be caught, plain
> and simple.  No way around it.  No way for us to contribute by running a
> relay.  Zero, nada.  We utterly depend on bridges hosted outside our
> geography, to have any hope of accessing Tor.  Some of us who have
> facilities in another country might help, but for us that is comparatively
> difficult and expensive.
>
> The only reason I can access the "outside world" is due to people who
> hosts bridges for us.  If you guys pack and go home, nothing we can do.
> Zero, nada.  I am writing this email over Tor.
>
> - Jack
>
> 3. Apr 2018 16:02 by development at jivanamara.net:
>
> Hey Jack,
>
> Here's my understanding of your concerns, anyone else please chime in if
> I'm mistaken anywhere.
>
> For running a normal relay compared to a client connecting to a relay
> via obfs4, it's less likely to be discovered by examining the content of
> traffic.  The obfs4 protocol is designed to disguise the connection
> between a client (i.e. torbrowser).  Once the traffic hits a relay, the
> interaction between relays contains less opportunities to identify it as
> tor traffic as opposed to any other encrypted traffic.
>
> That being said, there are a couple of other things that would make it
> very easy to identify a TOR relay.  First, by default, relays are listed
> for anyone to examine.
>
> Second, if the authorities are watching, the change in traffic to/from
> your home computer will be pretty obvious.
>
> Regarding your concerns about children being inappropriately exposed to
> the dark web, running a relay will make very little difference compared
> to not running one.  For your children to see the content of the dark
> web they'll need to install torbrowser (or equivalent) and that's going
> to be the same whether or not you're running a relay.  The only
> potential difference is that if in your area it's very difficult to
> connect to the tor network and your children know you're running a
> relay, with some knowledge they could configure torbrowser to connect
> first to your relay.  In some sense, if the authorities are successful
> in blocking access to the tor network, you could be enabling their romps
> on the dark web.
>
> HTH
>
> Jivan
>
>
> On 04/03/2018 02:38 AM, tor-relays-request at lists.torproject.org wrote:
>
> Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> tor-relays-request at lists.torproject.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> tor-relays-owner at lists.torproject.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: failed setup of obfs4 on relay (jackoreamnos at tutanota.com)
> 2. Re: failed setup of obfs4 on relay (jackoreamnos at tutanota.com)
> 3. Re: Estimation of bridge traffic / Bridge or relay needed?
> (jackoreamnos at tutanota.com)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 05:00:18 +0200 (CEST)
> From: <jackoreamnos at tutanota.com>
> To: <tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> Cc: <tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] failed setup of obfs4 on relay
> Message-ID: <L98Ret7--3-0 at tutanota.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Thank you all, that was very helpful. - Jack
>
> 30. Mar 2018 20:53 by arma at mit.edu <mailto:arma at mit.edu>:
>
> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 04:52:23PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>
> For obfs4, the active prober doesn't know the secret "cert" parameter,
>
> For far far more detail on the various pluggable transports and how
> they look on the wire, check out this awesome page that David Fifield
> put together:
>
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports
> <
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports
> >
>
> --Roger
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays>
>
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20180403/1e860483/attachment-0002.html
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 05:00:18 +0200 (CEST)
> From: <jackoreamnos at tutanota.com>
> To: <tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> Cc: <tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] failed setup of obfs4 on relay
> Message-ID: <L98Ret7--3-0 at tutanota.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Thank you all, that was very helpful. - Jack
>
> 30. Mar 2018 20:53 by arma at mit.edu <mailto:arma at mit.edu>:
>
> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 04:52:23PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>
> For obfs4, the active prober doesn't know the secret "cert" parameter,
>
> For far far more detail on the various pluggable transports and how
> they look on the wire, check out this awesome page that David Fifield
> put together:
>
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports
> <
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports
> >
>
> --Roger
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays>
>
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20180403/1e860483/attachment-0003.html
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 10:38:38 +0200 (CEST)
> From: <jackoreamnos at tutanota.com>
> To: <tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> Cc: <tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Estimation of bridge traffic / Bridge or
> relay needed?
> Message-ID: <L99e63k--3-0 at tutanota.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Want to follow up the discussion on encouraging people to run relays.
>
> The powers that be where I live now heavily frowns upon VPN and Tor.  And
> a fair number in our community is sensing further tightening in the air.
>
> Today we had a discussion, we had a lot of questions.  I try to summarize
> below and see if we can fact-check and learn more.
>
> (1) Advocacy: Background - Someone raised the idea that we should each run
> a Tor relay in each of our house.  Someone said the powers that be cannot
> put all of us in jail if we get enough people to host Tor.  A parent among
> us said, "I never before had an urge to run a VPN or Tor.  But when running
> encryption and sharing a VPN tunnel with a criminal on the next packet is
> required to ensure your freedom to read BBC, you feel queasy and you worry
> what your underage kids might stumble on, things they are too young to deal
> with on the dark web.  But loosing the freedom to read BBC makes me feel
> beyond queasy, beyond nauseated, and bilious, and sick..."  He used a few
> more adjectives that I cannot spell.  There were non technical users who
> expressed interest to run a non-exit relay, but only if they will be able
> to run an installer and click the next button and only use default
> options.  And only if they can feel assured they understand the risks.
>
>   (1.a) Their underage kids will not stumble on the dark web before they
> are old enough to know they are doing.  Underage kids should not be able to
> stumble on the dark web on the computer the Tor relay is run (and what must
> be done to assure that).  And underage kids should not be able to stumble
> on the dark web by being on the same WIFI network in the house.
>
>   (1.b) There are different degrees of fear of risks.  Some are brave
> enough to run a non-relay in the house where they live.  We think they need
> to assume they can be detected.  Some were only willing to consider if the
> non-exit Tor cannot be easily detected.  The definition of not easily
> varies:
>   - as difficult to detect as the obfs4 bridge protocol (but someone said
> the bridge protocol only works between a Tor client and a Tor relay, but
> not between a Tor relay and another Tor relay; we have not been able to
> confirm this by our own efforts)
>  - as difficult as the meek protocol (someone said the idea of meek is to
> encrypt Tor packets and send it to a unblocked IP/domain, where the traffic
> is decrypted and copied to a proper Tor network); someone said he is
> willing to run a meek server to accept incoming connections, but only if
> the outgoing connections are at least obfs4.  Someone said if we have many
> thousands of these tiny meek nodes hosted at our home address, we offload
> the official meek proxies run on amazon and azure.  And even if we
> contribute only 1kb/s each, it is going to be more than sharing the cost -
> the idea is we want a high level of household penetration so that the
> powers that be find it hard to clamp us down.
>   - as difficult to detect as protected by a VPN.  Someone said he would
> pay for a VPN package, run a relay on a machine which only talks to the
> world through the VPN.  But someone said that works for a Tor client, but
> not for a relay because a relay would need to have its own IP and listen on
> certain ports on that IP, and so because you VPN exit point will not let
> you listen on any port numbers, even if he is willing to pay for a
> commercial VPN that exits in another country, his tor relay cannot accepts
> incoming connections.  Some people would give up running a non-exit if this
> cannot be done.  The only IP they can access is where they sleep, and they
> want to be able to sleep well.  Not just them, but their wife and their
> children needs to sleep well too.  Is the ability to accept incoming
> connections a requirement to running a non-exit relay?
>
> (2) There is a sentiment that we should get "every household to run a Tor"
> so that the powers that be will find it much harder to clamp down.  Someone
> said he would install a Tor relay on every single computer he controls, to
> support journalism and news reporting, if what he contributes ONLY goes
> towards beating censorship against the media.  He said he feels it is a
> much easier sell if the sole function of that node is to allow people
> living under censorship to read newspaper.  He said if there is a funding
> campaign to deploy the onion enterprise toolkit for news media, he will
> want to direct his donation specifically to those.  Or if he can run an
> exit relay ONLY for for the BBC news domain.  He said, then running Tor is
> a much easier sell to his family and friends.  If the police brings him in,
> the back and forth will not be "we observed spams and hacks and viruses and
> copyright infringements on your IP", but the back and forth will just be
> "you are reading something you should not read on the web" and we can have
> a much better chance of advocating for "Tor relay in every home".  We know
> in general Tor supports more network access than reading the news.  But
> compared to countries where the freedom to run Tor exits are protected by
> law, living where we live we want to make it a much easier sell, and
> eventually to get a higher penetration so that the penetration itself
> becomes a barrier for the powers that be to clamp us down.
>
> And as we are not experts, and as we run real risks, and as we want our
> family to sleep well, we have framed our "requirements" or "prerequisites"
> to run Tor relays almost beyond the reasonable.  You might want to call us
> paranoid.  If there is a way for us paranoid people to run relays and to
> advocate, please help us.
>
> Jack
>
> 2. Apr 2018 07:36 by arma at mit.edu <mailto:arma at mit.edu>:
>
>     On Mon, Apr 02, 2018 at 03:32:00AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
>
>         > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#RelayOrBridge <
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#RelayOrBridge>
>         >
>         > "If you have lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a
> normal relay.
>         > If you're willing to be an exit, you should definitely run a
> normal
>         > relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an exit and
> only have a
>         > little bit of bandwidth, be a bridge. Thanks for volunteering!"
>
>         The 'normal's above are ambiguous and conflicting.
>         Replace them with 'non-exit' and 'exit'.
>
>
>     Ah, actually no, replace them with "relay" and "relay".
>
>     In that text, "normal relay" is as opposed to "bridge relay".
>
>     The FAQ text sure needs some updating.
>
>     --Roger
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     tor-relays mailing list
>     tor-relays at lists.torproject.org <
> mailto:tor-relays at lists.torproject.org>
>     https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays>
>
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20180403/ead69030/attachment.html
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 87, Issue 4
> *****************************************
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
-- 
Matthew Glennon
matthew at glennon.online
PGP Signing Available Upon Request
https://keybase.io/crazysane
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20180404/3ef1f459/attachment-0001.html>