[tor-relays] hi-jacking an onion address

[Toralf Förster]

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On 10/14/2017 09:41 AM, Jacki M wrote:
> Look at the Tor Rendezvous Specification rend-spec-v3.txt
> <https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt>, the
> onion addresses that a user enter are Self authenticating, Because the
> onion address is the public key of the hidden service. 
> Roger explains this in the DEF CON talk
> here https://youtu.be/Di7qAVidy1Y?t=1124
> Thx for the links.

My questions goes rather in the direction that by this a malicious Toir could catch all the traffic designed for the other Tor - even without encrypting it - and therefore dry-ing out that Tor.

- -- 
Toralf
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