[tor-relays] Who is running the two biggest Exits in the network?

[Cristian Consonni]

On 27/05/2017 00:55, nusenu wrote:
>> I'm just wanting to raise the point, that while lack of contact
>> information may be concerning, in my opinion the contact information is
>> definitely not something you should rely on to assess how untrustworthy
>> a given relay is. A person or group with malicious intentions can fake
>> this, easily.
> 
> Agreed.

I do not see how faking contact info could be useful if the target is
_the network_ instead of _the operator_.

If an attacker sets up a malicious node and sets up the contact info of
another (existing) operator, this only increases the chances that
somebody contacts the person, that will at this point disown the node
and it would be clear that something fishy it is going on.

Of course, on the other hand I see the scenario of faking contact
information to attack the reputation of an operator and get him in trouble.

What am I missing?

C

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