[tor-relays] Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)

[Aeris]

> I don't know any context or background but if you fear this could happen
> to you again, I recommend to use tor's OfflineMasterKey feature (without
> copying the master key to the server) with a short keylifetime (i.e. 7
> days), especially if it is a fallback dir
> (which requires a tor source code change to remove it).

Thanks for this feature, I don't know it !

> Could you also confirm the relay fingerprints (in addition to the
> nicknames)?

kitten1 86E78DD3720C78DA8673182EF96C54B162CD660C
kitten2 2EBD117806EE43C3CC885A8F1E4DC60F207E7D3E

Regards,
-- 
Aeris
Individual crypto-terrorist group self-radicalized on the digital Internet
https://imirhil.fr/

Protect your privacy, encrypt your communications
GPG : EFB74277 ECE4E222
OTR : 5769616D 2D3DAC72
https://café-vie-privée.fr/
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