[tor-relays] DoS attacks on multiple relays

[grarpamp]

> [tor project regularly publishes exit addresses] ...

Which thankfully not all blockers (censors) use, and equally
some relay operators then leverage their anti censorship
philosophy into those holes.

> I call attention to the fact that the tor project has already decided
> against Exit node secrecy by regularly publishing

>      However, the tor project has publicly promised to identify publicly
> all Exit source addresses

In part because fear of getting rejected by the rest of the internet, sued,
and chilled into shutdown for not providing easy means of censorship.
Legal best for a corporation et al and paychecks, is not always in
alignment with profferred, or even all potential, use cases of its products,
or users of same.

> ... so that system administrators everywhere who wish
> to block tor Exits to their networks may do so without blocking all tor
> relays.

Those who block tor exit traffic from tor nodes inbound to their networks
could care less than a fuck about allowing non-exit traffic from tor nodes
inbound to their networks.

It's operators trying to surf out from their nodes, and hosting services
trying to make money (by taking non-exit money while avoiding taint).
that cared about establishing such distinction.

>      Are you now alleging that

Chilling and censorship is real. That sucks. Fight it.