[tor-relays] Action relays on 188.214.30.0/24 subnet

[x9p]

> Clients don't choose relays in the same /16 in the same circuit.
> So I don't think this is a danger to users.

Ok.

> We would like to write a polite email saying:
> "thanks for helping Tor, please add a family to your config".
>
> But since they haven't provided contact details, we can't do that.
>
> T
>
> --
> Tim / teor
>
> PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B
> ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------


But as Aneesh pointed out in the other thread:

>---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
>Subject: Re: [tor-relays] DoS attacks on multiple relays
>From:    "Aneesh Dogra" <lionaneesh at gmail.com>
>Date:    Tue, December 5, 2017 9:37 am
>To:      tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Looks scary. Interesting to see they all have high guard probabilities. :-?

My concerns are more about the HS harvesting/correlation capabilities
these relays have, than de-anonymisation of users.

I am not a Tor specialist, but would like to know if there are any kind of
safety measures against such persons/entities employing automated big
farms, high speed, stable guards, HSDir, without family set, or proposals
being discussed on the topic.

cheers.

x9p