[tor-relays] Law Enforcement Request

[teor]

> On 27 Apr 2017, at 04:59, David Stainton <dstainton415 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> What was the guard discovery attack they used?
> Was it one of the well known published guard discovery attack or
> another new one?

They did not tell us, but it might have been based on traffic analysis.

> On 27 Apr 2017, at 05:06, tor <tor at anondroid.com> wrote:
> 
> Could you share the verbiage you used to refuse the request? Or offer any general guidance for other guard operators in case they receive a similar request? I can imagine there may be certain jurisdictions where refusing such a request might be problematic.

I cannot, it was a conversation that involved other people.

> Also, are there any guidelines for reducing the log footprint of a relay? Are the OS defaults generally sufficient, or do operators need to take additional steps to preserve user privacy?

The tor defaults are generally sufficient.

But if you install a caching DNS server on an exit, make sure that no
domains are ever logged.

For example, bind9 logs domain resolution errors containing domains
by default. (I sent a message to this list about that last year.)

T

--
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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