[tor-relays] Handling abuse - like to get your help please

[Tristan]

But the point of Tor is to promote open access to the Internet. Once Tor
starts filtering traffic, it's no better than the government censorship so
many people use Tor to get around. They'd go from one filter to another.

I understand your point, but I don't think we can accurately detect
malicious traffic without compromising the security of other Tor users.
Even if we could, there's always the 1% of legitimate uses that would be
marked as malicious.

Security, privacy, or convenience, choose any 2.
On Jun 21, 2016 9:46 AM, <gerard at bulger.co.uk> wrote:

> If it is Tor philosophy to prevent criminal activity then should not tor
> develop other tools apart from port and IP blocking?  I am less certain
> that we can ring our hands of this issue. We will have fewer and fewer exit
> nodes until the gross attacks like multiple login attempts are restrained
> in someway.  Those exit nodes that have such restrictions would announce
> the fact
> on atlas.
>
> Gerry
>
> Sent from my Cyanogen phone
> On 21 Jun 2016 14:39, BlinkTor <toradmin at brazoslink.net> wrote:
>
> On Jun 20, 2016, at 4:19 AM, pa011 <pa011 at web.de> wrote:
> >
> > Hi all,
> >
> > thanks again for your hints - in my case they obviously find Tor less
> > fancy - their response today is following:
> >
> > "Hello.
> > You need to take steps to ensure that the complaint would be no longer
> > received.
> > This software is only allowed if there are no complaints on the server."
> >
> > As I cant close Port 80 and the next attack would be a different target
> > I guess there is not much room for response :-(
> >
> > Rgds
> >
> > Paul
>
> Paul,
>
> This is a recurring issue that will not go away, because protecting
> malicious traffic is part of the foundational Tor philosophy. Tor very
> intentionally has no ability (beyond rudimentary port/host blocking) to
> control the type of traffic it carries, there are no plans to add any sort
> of IDS functionality, and filtering exit relay traffic is frowned upon by
> the Tor community. This is why abuse reports happen, and it's the primary
> reason that Tor relays are blocked by so many services—typically not
> because folks are against personal privacy, but because they simply take a
> very practical approach to network security. So, if you (or your ISP)
> determine that the benefits of Tor aren’t compelling enough to turn a blind
> eye to malicious Tor traffic and the abuse reports it generates, then your
> only real options are to either not run an exit, or not run Tor at all.
>
> That’s just the way it is.
>
> Jon
>
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