[tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Moritz Bartl]

On 06/13/2016 12:53 AM, Dr Gerard Bulger wrote:
> TORRC.   If I can do that why is it reprehensible in TOR lore to attempt
> something more subtle and pre-emptive?

Because you're introducing defects into the network. A client has no way
of knowing what happens, and there is no way of identifying "malicious
traffic" reliably. What does malicious even mean. Plus the legal
implications, the "you're the network layer passing data because that's
the definition of the Internet" argument, etc etc.

> Of course much internet traffic is repugnant, but Tor attracts a higher
> proportion. 

How do you know that? You don't. When I talk to "regular" ISPs and
access providers, they also see a lot of abuse. It used to be case until
recently that a lot of access providers in Germany did not store which
of their users was using a particular IP, so they also couldn't do much
about it. Same with all the VPN providers.

> Tor is being strangled by the abuse.

You say that. I say it's not. If your ISP does not like that you cannot
do more than block destinations or ports, then find another.

> other attacks on servers that could be blocked of hindered.  Tor is
> getting a bad press and law makers respond impetuously to make bad laws
> making matters worse.   

Tor is getting bad press because it does not have a magic filter that
filters bad traffic. Okay. It does not get bad press because it is not
using any existing filters that you seem to be proposing.

More specifically, which events and types of traffic would you plan to
filter, and how? Have you looked at the capabilities of these types of
systems?

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/