[tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Gareth Llewellyn]

On 12 Jun 2016 5:49 p.m., "Jonathan Baker-Bates" <jonathan at bakerbates.com>
wrote:
> But along the way I asked some others about the legal implications of
doing what the ISP had asked. The rough consensus was that in the UK at
least, I would only be able to evesdrop on traffic once consent had been
given by those being monitored. Otherwise I'd be illegally wiretapping and
open to prosecution. But it was far from clear what would happen if
somebody took me a court!
>

Indeed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the
Investigatory Powers Bill contain offences relating to surveillance of
traffic without a warrant / permission etc. (Caveats etc apply)

> On 12 June 2016 at 16:12, Dr Gerard Bulger <gerard at bulger.co.uk> wrote:
>> Once TOR
>> exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery
slope.

FWIW one of the reasons we have the "pirate" blocks (in the UK) is that the
High Court Judge (Hon. justice Arnold) in the case was informed that the
ISPs in question had the ability to block sites (e.g. Cleanfeed) therefore
it was possible for them to block more.

Had this ISP level censorship technology not existed then we wouldn't be in
*quite* the situation we are now.

>> It is more than embarrassing to run an exit node and get abuse complaints
>> about persistent and repeated attacks on an IP. The intent is clearly
>> criminal.  VPS providers in the UK are increasing intolerant in receiving
>> such complaints.  The whole VPS can be closed down by the ISP/VPS
provider
>> not forcing a closure of the TOR exit.  Fewer ISPs will allow you to
install
>> an exit node at all.

This is one of the reasons why I started a UK ISP (AS28715) - I now run UK
exits and don't have issues with them getting shutdown because the ISP got
cold feet / got bored of abuse emails / complaints from other customers
(entire /24 blocked by anti-tor blacklists) etc etc.

Good ISPs don't deploy web filtering, transparent proxies or IDS' that
interfere with traffic. IMHO well behaved Tor Exits shouldn't either.
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