[tor-relays] [tor-dev] How many exits exit from an IP address different than their OR address? (10.7%)

[grarpamp]

On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:44 AM, Jesse V <kernelcorn at riseup.net> wrote:
> This is quite interesting, thanks for the report. I'm not sure why it
> would be advantageous to set up a server or network this way, but I
> guess they have their reasons.

1) They may or may not be aware of their routing, or the routing
applied to them.
2) Having this feature in the network doesn't break anything, except for maybe
check.torproject.org, and a handful of clearnet sites that attempt and
often fail
to redirect you to their onion, no big deal, hit the new circuit
button and try again.
3) Having this feature in the network greatly enhances Tor user's ability
to select an exit and get around silly Tor blocks that rely on various
consensus,
RBL, DNS, whatever lists. Whether it's censorship of the source or destination,
it's still censorship. And getting around censorship is one key
features and critical
use cases of Tor.

There is no specification that says exits must exit from their OR IP,
or any other IP.
I seriously don't know why people continue to get their panties in a
bunch over this.
Please stop. Nice stats though.

cc tt tr because relavance