[tor-relays] 0.2.8.11 bridge + hidden service, restart loop

Petrusko petrusko at riseup.net
Fri Dec 9 22:59:47 UTC 2016


Hey,

Compiled current 0.2.8.11 (git-c49e563d0096aa5d) on a RPi,
set up as a bridge + hidden service (http)

Before update, everything was fine.
Now, it's starting only fine when only bridge is enabled....

If hidden service is enabled in torrc, some problems :
- restart loop
- /var/log/tor/notices.log is not used. but can watch log in
/var/log/syslog file...

Custom hostname + private_key in hidden_service, it was nice before...

Thx for your help :)


Dec  9 23:48:06 XXX systemd[1]: Starting Anonymizing overlay network for
TCP...
Dec  9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.336 [notice] Tor
v0.2.8.11 (git-c49e563d0096aa5d) running on Linux with Libevent
2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t and Zlib 1.2.8.
Dec  9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.342 [notice] Tor can't
help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at
https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
Dec  9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.343 [notice] Read
configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
Dec  9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.343 [notice] Read
configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Dec  9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.399 [warn] Tor is
currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. That's not very
secure: you should probably run your hidden service in a separate Tor
process, at least -- see https://trac.torproject.org/8742
Dec  9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.405 [notice] Based on
detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 361 MB. You can
override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand.
Dec  9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Configuration was valid
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.088 [notice] Tor
v0.2.8.11 (git-c49e563d0096aa5d) running on Linux with Libevent
2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t and Zlib 1.2.8.
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.093 [notice] Tor can't
help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at
https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.093 [notice] Read
configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.094 [notice] Read
configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.151 [warn] Tor is
currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. That's not very
secure: you should probably run your hidden service in a separate Tor
process, at least -- see https://trac.torproject.org/8742
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.157 [notice] Based on
detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 361 MB. You can
override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand.
*Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: tor at default.service: main process
exited, code=exited, status=1/FAILURE**
**Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [warn] Directory
/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ cannot be read: Permission denied**
**Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [warn] Failed to
parse/validate config: Failed to configure rendezvous options. See logs
for details.**
**Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [err] Reading
config failed--see warnings above.**
**Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Failed to start Anonymizing overlay
network for TCP.**
**Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Unit tor at default.service entered
failed state.**
**Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: tor at default.service holdoff time over,
scheduling restart.*
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Stopping Anonymizing overlay network for
TCP...
Dec  9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Starting Anonymizing overlay network for
TCP...

-- 
Petrusko
EBE23AE5

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