[tor-relays] 90% of exits vulnerable to TCP off-path attack

[dawuud]

Indeed! Perhaps we can extend the research paper's (the actual paper not that silly article)
4-tuple inference to infer tor connections for a given relay without knowledge of the connecting
relay's IP address by extending the permutation space using the current tor relay consensus.


On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 11:52:55AM -0400, starlight.2016q3 at binnacle.cx wrote:
> [one last time, no DKIM for Tor lists nevermore]
> 
> RFC-5961
> 
> CVE-2016-5696
> 
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/08/10/linux_tor_users_open_corrupted_communications/
> 
> FYI all
> 
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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