[tor-relays] Deciding where to put new Tor relays

[A. Johnson]

Hi Virgil,

It appears that vizAS detects connections between ASes when they are observed as adjacent on paths reported by Route Views [0]. When I construct AS-level routing maps (e.g. as in [1]), I combine Route Views data with the AS-level topology produced by CAIDA [2]. The CAIDA topology is created from links observed in the traceroutes continually performed by their three (I think) teams of ~12 probers each.

Do you know how APNIC/RIPE produces the “high-quality BGP-peering graphs for the entire Internet”? I know that RIPE has been building a pretty large Internet measurement platform called Atlas [3]. I wonder if they are using some of that data.

Cheers,
Aaron

[0] "University of Oregon Route Views Project”, <http://www.routeviews.org/ <http://www.routeviews.org/>>
[1] "Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries”, <http://ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf <http://ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf>>
[2] "IPv4 Routed /24 AS Links Dataset”, <http://www.caida.org/data/active/ipv4_routed_topology_aslinks_dataset.xml <http://www.caida.org/data/active/ipv4_routed_topology_aslinks_dataset.xml>>
[3] "Welcome to RIPE Atlas!”, <https://atlas.ripe.net/ <https://atlas.ripe.net/>>

> On Sep 21, 2015, at 8:28 AM, Virgil Griffith <i at virgil.gr> wrote:
> 
> After talking with APNIC/RIPE, it looks like that if we ask nicely we can get high-quality BGP-peering graphs for the entire Internet (not 100% complete, but it's the same data they use internally).
> 
> Spend some time thinking about exactly what kinds of attacks we wish to harden against.  Once we understand the attacks, I'll figure out the appropriate graph-theory for hardening against it.
> 
> -V
> 
> On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 6:48 PM Moritz Bartl <moritz at torservers.net <mailto:moritz at torservers.net>> wrote:
> Interesting, thanks for the update. Maybe we can find some time at the
> dev meeting to chat. :)
> 
> Moritz
> 
> On 09/10/2015 07:12 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > I'm at an APNIC conference in Jakarta, and they demoed a new tool which
> > shows the interconnections (peering + transits) between AS numbers
> > within a given country (will eventually work for regions).
> >
> > URL: http://labs.apnic.net/vizas/ <http://labs.apnic.net/vizas/>
> > Left-panel is IPv4 and right-panel is IPv6.
> >
> > Here is the fellow who built it:
> > https://www.linkedin.com/pub/geoff-huston/42/828/891 <https://www.linkedin.com/pub/geoff-huston/42/828/891>
> >
> >
> > For Tor, this tool helps us prioritize the ASs for new relays.  To
> > maximize censorship resistance, we would want relays on AS numbers in
> > the middle (lots of interconnections) that do not currently have Tor relays.
> >
> > We can imagine giving out Roster bonus points depending on the
> > AS-number.  The points would go something like:
> >
> > AS_i_bonus_points = ASweight(i) / #_Tor_relays_on_AS
> >
> > ASweight(i) = k * \sum_{j=1}^n num_ips_routed_by_edge_i_j
> > where k is an arbitrary constant (k=1 is reasonable).
> >
> > This could be very useful for deciding where to put new relays.  I'll
> > see if I can access to the raw data that generates these graphs so we
> > have more than just pretty pictures.
> >
> > Much love,
> > -V
> 
> --
> Moritz Bartl
> https://www.torservers.net/ <https://www.torservers.net/>
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