[tor-relays] TAO on tor ops

[Christopher Sheats]

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Hi,

On 07/03/2014 02:13 PM, obx at riseup.net wrote:
> Do we have to assume to get targeted by TAO?
> Should we dump hardware ordered online?
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
I think that this is a valid risk to look into. Given the
history/information in the Snowden docs, I assume that it is not
possible / costs too much to perform active, local surveillance on even
a majority of Tor relays. I also have doubts that local surveillance on
relays is at all beneficial. However, I think there is greater risk for
exit routers, particularly ones that routinely receive the guard flag.

Looking forward to further discussion.

- -- 
Christopher Sheats
yawnbox at gmail.com
GnuPG: 8397 7B9F D8BA 3EE5 71EF FDF3 C761 02B0 A531 D73D
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