[tor-relays] obfs3 a risk to scramblesuit?
Delton Barnes
delton.barnes at mail.ru
Fri Feb 14 01:27:32 UTC 2014
I am running a bridge with both obfs3 and scramblesuit. obfs3 is
vulnerable to active probing. Say someone in China makes the mistake of
connecting with obfs3 instead of scramblesuit, and active probing
identifies it as a Tor bridge. Wouldn't the bridge IP address then be
blacklisted, making it impossible for other people to connect even with
scramblesuit? Would it make sense, then, as a bridge operator to elect
to only support scramblesuit, even though no one will use it for a
while? It seems you are only as good as your weakest transport.
Thanks,
Delton
p.s. Would reply to original thread about scramblesuit, but I only just
joined the mailing list, and cannot figure out how to reply to
preexisting messages.
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