[tor-relays] Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor

[Alexander Dietrich]

According to Qualys, they have developed a test that "verifies the 
problem without retrieving any bytes from the server, other than the 
bytes we send in the heartbeat request":
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2014/04/08/ssl-labs-test-for-the-heartbleed-attack

Best regards,
Alexander
---
PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp

On 2014-04-09 20:51, Paul Pearce wrote:
>> * Should authorities scan for bad OpenSSL versions and force their 
>> weight
>> down to 20?
> 
> I'd be interested in hearing people's thoughts on how to do such
> scanning ethically (and perhaps legally). I was under the impression
> the only way to do this right now is to actually trigger the bounds
> bug and export some quantity (at least 1 byte) of memory from the
> vulnerable machine.
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