[tor-relays] Relay security, re: local network

[Cook]

On 26.9.2013 23:25, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> EFF recommends against it in their Legal FAQ:
> "Should I run an exit relay from my home?"
> https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq
>
> Their recommendation comes from dealing with one too many distraught
> relay operators who had confused DEA agents show up at their house and
> take everything including their toaster "because it might be evidence".
>
> In general we've been doing pretty well at teaching law enforcement in
> the US about how Tor works:
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-october-fbi-conference
> but a) there are many other countries out there, and b) all it takes is
> one guy who didn't read his "there's this thing called Tor" briefing,
> or didn't believe it, to ruin your day/week/month.
>
> So, feel free to do it, but also be aware there's a
> tiny-but-hard-to-actually-estimate chance of getting to spend a lot of
> time teaching people about Tor.
>
> Thanks!
> --Roger
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

So exits are desperately needed, but not badly enough to recommend 
running them where it would be the most convenient to set up, easiest to 
troubleshoot and manage, and most cost-effective to run (my personal 
experience and opinion, may not reflect that of others)? Granted, many, 
if not most consumer connections are capped too low to be of much 
individual value in terms of output volume, but i recall reading 
somewhere on these mailing lists and/or the Tor Project FAQs about how 
important diversity is, as opposed to clustering most exits to a handful 
of physical locations with fat cables.

I don't mean to sound rude, i just hate the way the world works with 
these things. Don't we all?