[tor-relays] NSA's "Tor Stinks"

[Raistlin Majere]

Noob question here, I have some servers on the net one of which is not
too busy. How much bandwidth on average does a Tor gateway eat up in a
month? And will that Tor gateway still remain anonymous even if I run
other 'Public' services on the same server?

R.M.

On 10/08/2013 03:23 PM, Jesse Victors wrote:
> 
> I recently ran across several articles related to the NSA's attempts at
> cracking Tor and de-anonymizing its users. They are after terrorists and
> other individuals who seek to do harm of course, but their work
> obviously has implications into other Tor users, the vast majority of
> whom use Tor for legal and proper activities. So far, it appears that
> the cryptographic standards and protocols implemented by the Tor devs
> appear to be holding, which I find interesting. The NSA has been trying
> other methods to figure out Tor, including identifying and then
> infecting user machines, trying to control/hijack the Tor network, or by
> influencing the network as a whole, and they've had a very small amount
> of success, but not much. One thing that was especially interesting to
> me (and I expect to everyone on this mailing list) is that they are
> trying to control more relays via cooperation or direct access, which
> can then be used for timing attacks or disruptions to the users. They
> are also trying to shape traffic to friendly exits. For anyone
> interested, I would highly recommend these links:
> http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-document
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24429332
> http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
> 
> Also, from
> http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-high-secure-internet-anonymity
> it appears that their opinion of Tails is that it "adds severe CNE
> misery to [the] equation". These are all highly informative articles,
> and it appears that Tor is remaining resilient to their efforts, as long
> as people (including relay/exit operators) use the latest software,
> remain aware that Tor doesn't protect them in all aspects, and as long
> as there are enough non-NSA relays and exits (we need more!) such that
> everything they see still remains encrypted and anonymous. Interesting I
> say.
> 
> Jesse V.
> 
> 
> 
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